Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms by Cameron, Evan Wm.
 
 
Francis Bacon  and the  
Pragmatic Theory of Forms 
 
Evan Wm. Cameron 
 
Professor Emeritus Senior Scholar in Screenwriting 
 
Graduate Programmes, Film & Video and Philosophy 
 
York University 
 
 
[Published as pages 592-610 of Philosophical Forum 5 
(New Series), No. 4 (Summer, 1974). This essay was the 
first philosophical publication of the author. A sentence on 
page 8 has been repositioned, end notes converted into 
footnotes and the bibliography refined.] 
 
 
 
Francis Bacon and the  
Pragmatic Theory of Forms1 
 
 
 . . . .philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
however is to change it. 
 
Karl Marx2 
 
. . . of myself I say nothing; but in behalf of the business which is in hand I 
entreat men to believe that it is not an opinion to be held, but a work to be 
done; and to be well assured that l am laboring to lay the foundation, not of any 
sect or doctrine, but of human utility and power. 
 
Francis Bacon3 
 
 
I 
 
To Francis Bacon there were three "beams of man's knowledge"; the "Radius Directus" 
by which nature is known; the "Radius Refractus" by which God is known; and the 
"Radius Reﬂectus" by which "man beholdeth and contemplateth himself".4 These 
epistemological modes were distinct and self-sufficient, permitting no shift of method or 
content from one to another. 
 
 
1 I wish to thank Professor Donald C. Williams, one of my ﬁnest teachers, for introducing 
me to the writings of Francis Bacon and for carefully criticising an earlier draft of this paper with 
whose principal thesis he is in total, spirited yet scrupulously fair disagreement, as those who 
know and respect him as I do might well have expected. 
2 Karl Marx, from “Thesis #11 on Feuerbach’s Philosophy”, as quoted by Barrows 
Dunham, “On Teaching Marxist Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29, #4, October 1961, 
page 365. 
3 From page 16 of the reproduction of Bacon's Preface to The Great Instauration within 
Francis Bacon [1], listed within the Bibliography of works at the end of this essay to which all 
further citations will be made. [I shall hereafter refer to Bacon's New Organon (or Novum 
Organum), as it appears within Francis Bacon [1], as NO.] 
4 From page 256 of the reproduction of Bacon's The Advancement of Learning within 
Francis Bacon [2]. [I shall refer hereafter to Bacon's text, as it appears within Francis Bacon [2], 
as AOL.] 
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The theory of Forms was conceived by Bacon to be part of the "Radius Directus", and 
was thus assumed to be inapplicable to either of the other two modes of human 
knowledge. But what role did the Forms play in the Radius Directus? In particular, were 
they or were they not natural objects (i.e., entities in the natural universe)? 
 
To answer the above questions, I shall ﬁrstly examine Bacon's ontology of nature. 
Against this ontological backdrop, I shall then argue for an interpretation of the theory 
of Forms that is pragmatic and non-ontological (as, I believe, Bacon himself once spent a 
lifetime doing). 
 
 
II 
 
Philosophers have interpreted the natural universe in various ways. In so doing, they 
have expressed with varying degrees of clarity and assurance a variety of conceptions 
concerning the ontological status of various types of entities. To most philosophers the 
question 'What is there?' could not be answered with insight in any simple fashion, and 
elaborate schemes of ontological classiﬁcation have arisen in the face of it. Francis 
Bacon, however, thought otherwise. To the ontological question there was a simple, 
single and straightforward answer: matter. The particles of matter existed in widely 
varying patterns of motion and combination, of course, for otherwise the diversity of 
nature could hardly be explained. But to Bacon this was not to be confused with the 
false assertion that the patterns of notion and combination existed as entities in 
themselves distinct from natter.  
 
The natural universe consisted of matter having properties; it did not consist of 
matter and properties. 
 
Bacon's ontological position is most clearly express in De Sapientia Veterum (1609), a 
collection of classical fables interpreted in a charming though "thoroughly naturalistic" 
manner.5 While employing the fable of Cupid to explain the nature of the atom, 
"primary matter, together with its properties, is distinguished in treatment from 
matter's motion".6 What emerges is a conception of the elementary particles of matter 
as containing an intrinsic propensity toward combination and motion. 
 
 
5 F. H. Anderson [2], page 57. 
6 Ibid., page 78. 
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Bacon's conception of matter as essentially alive, a thing developing out of an 
inherent principle of motion, is one of the most important of his contributions 
to philosophy and points forward to modern evolutionary views.7 
 
Indeed, all the properties of formed matter (i.e., the simple natures with which the 
Forms were to be associated in the Novum Organum) are conceived as being 
ontologically grounded in a particular type of motion. 
 
This is local motion. . . According to Bacon all activity is to be explained as the 
local juxtaposition of parts of matter.8 
 
Yet it is not the essence of this primary motion with which Bacon's theory of Forms was 
to be concerned, for to Bacon the mode of power that structured matter into things is 
totally formless and hence "inexpressible" by finite man.9 Rather, Bacon was to be 
concerned with the patterns of its effect – its footprints as opposed to it. 
 
Love seems to be the appetite, or incentive, of the primitive matter.. .the 
natural motion, or moving principle, of the original corpuscles, or atoms: this 
being the most ancient and only power that made and wrought things out of 
matter. . .it could have no natural cause; for, excepting God, nothing was before 
it. . . And as nothing is more inward with nature, it can neither be a genus nor a 
form; and therefore, whatever it is, it must be somewhat positive, though 
inexpressible.10 
 
The theological sources of Bacon's ontological conception have seldom been sufficiently 
recognized, and a discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper. But it is clear that 
Bacon accepted the notion of the eternity of matter, though not the eternity of formed 
matter, in accordance with his theological and biblical persuasions. When interpreting 
the fable of Coelium, he expressly accepted the doctrine of Democritus, 
 
. . . who expressly asserts the eternity of matter; but denies the eternity of the 
world: thereby approaching to the truth of sacred writ, which makes chaos, or 
uninformed matter, to exist before the six days works.11 
 
 
7 Benjamin Farrington [1], page 79. 
8 F. H. Anderson [2], pages 76 and 77. 
9 I shall use double quotations marks " . . . " to indicate that a writer has used this exact 
word or phrase or a close derivative of it. 
10 Francis Bacon [5], remarks on the fable of Cupid, page 51. 
11 Ibid., remarks on the fable of Coelium, page 10. 
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Not only were the particles of matter eternal, in accordance with holy writ; but to Bacon 
the story of creation in Genesis had to do with the formation of bodies from particles of 
matter that already existed, for in the Novum Organum Bacon asserted that "the 
absolute quantum or sum total  of matter remains unchanged, without increase or 
diminution".12 Thus to Bacon "the universe is. ..the face of matter, not under 
constraint"13 (using the anthropomorphism "face" as in Genesis 2:1, "And the Spirit of 
God moved upon the face of the waters", to explain the universe of appearances as the 
property of matter rather than as a mode of existence distinct from matter). 
 
But it is at this point that the question of the relevance of Bacon's ontology to his theory 
of Forms arises. For to Bacon the universe consisted solely of "individual bodies 
performing individual acts according to a ﬁxed law", which bodies in turn were 
composed of substances composed in turn of the particles of matter.14 Bacon's 
substances were roughly equivalent to what we would today call 'elements' (although, 
as  one might expect, Bacon included among his substances various things that we 
would no longer consider elemental): "wood, iron, lead, cloth, parchment. . .," ". . . a 
lion . . . oak. . .gold . . . water . . . air," etc..15 Only bodies and their composite substances 
could be observed on the face of Bacon's universe (hence the use of the Genesis 
metaphor). But the essences of substances were not to be the subject of Bacon's theory 
of Forms any more than were the essences of compound bodies, for Bacon sharply 
castigated Paracelsus for "polluting" the springs of knowledge by engaging upon such a 
fruitless quest. 
 
Where you ought to have tried to calculate motions you grasped at the elusive, 
protean, nature of substances and thus polluted the springs of knowledge and 
left the human mind stripped of its aids.16 
 
If Bacon's theory of Forms, therefore, was not to be concerned with the essences of 
either substances or compound bodies, with what was it to be concerned? If (for 
whatever reason) one holds that Bacon's theory of Forms must have been concerned 
with the essence of matter at some level of his ontological scale (i.e., particles of matter, 
substances and bodies), then one is left with the essence of the non-appearing primary 
particles of matter themselves. But surely Bacon saw such particles as primary precisely 
because they were unanalyzable. Indeed, whereas Democritus has asked "whether all 
 
12 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 40), op. cit. (footnote 3), page 210. 
13 From Francis Bacon [5], remarks on the fable of Proteus, page 49. 
14 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 2 ), page 122. 
15 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 48), page 231; and Francis Bacon [2], AOL, op. cit. (footnote 
4), page 257. 
16 Benjamin Farrington [2], page 66. 
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things may be made out of all things", and, apparently believing an affirmative answer 
to be unreasonable, had accepted "diversity among atoms".17 Bacon rejected such a 
thesis as contrary to the principle of the nature of primary particles: 
 
Nor shall we be led to the doctrine of atoms, which implies the hypothesis of a 
vacuum and that of the unchangeableness of matter (both false assumptions); 
we shall be led only to real particles, such as really exist.18 
 
Of even greater signiﬁcance is the fact that Bacon, in the development of his inductive 
philosophy, found the related problem of the ontological status of a vacuum to be 
mildly confusing but hardly disruptive of his philosophy. Bacon accepted the idea of a 
vacuum in interpreting the fable of Cupid," rejected it in the passage cited above, and 
ﬁnally settled down into gentle agnosticism in Aphorism 48 of Book II of the Novum 
Organum. 
 
For I am not prepared to say for certain whether or no there be a vacuum, 
either collected in one place or interspersed in the pores of bodies. But of one 
thing I am satisﬁed, that the reason for which a vacuum was introduced by 
Leucippus and Democritus . . . is a false one.19 
 
Such disinterest could hardly have been countenanced if his ontology of primary 
particles had been essential to the validity of his theory of Forms. 
 
But if the theory of Forms was not to be concerned with the nature of matter on any 
ontological level, it seems that we are left with a theory that was to be concerned with 
nothing that is. And indeed that is quite correct, for, as Bacon insisted, "We must lead 
men to the particular themselves, and their series and order", not to discover what 
matter is, but what it can be made to do!20 Although nothing exists but matter, yet 
 
Matter, for Bacon, is not something deprived, formless, indeterminate, and 
inert, but a formed and active entity. It has within it causes and laws of lesser 
and greater generality, from which issue, as components of one body or system, 
without segregation of parts, all the particulars of nature . . . The form is the law 
of actual operation in matter.21 (italics mine) 
 
 
17 F. H. Anderson [2], page 72. 
18 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 8), page 129. 
19 Francis Bacon [5], page 55. 
20 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 48), page 248. 
21 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 75), page 47.  
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It is the nature of the properties of matter, not of matter itself, with which Bacon's 
theory of Forms was to be concerned. The properties have no mode of existence apart 
from matter, for only matter can be said to exist. When we speak of the form of a 
property, therefore, we are not speaking of the essence of an existing entity, but rather 
of the law of a "pure act" of matter.22 The essence of a property is the form of that 
property, but the form is a rule of the activity of matter, for, as expressed in the fable of 
Proteus, Bacon was seeking to know what matter "does, has done, or can do" – not 
what matter is! 
 
The addition in the fable that makes Proteus a prophet, who had the knowledge 
of things past, present, and future, excellently agrees with the nature of matter; 
as who knows the properties, the changes, and the processes of matter, must, 
of necessity, understand the effects and sum of what it does, has done, or can 
do; though his knowledge extends not to all the parts and particulars thereof.23 
 
 
III 
 
I have argued in Section II that, given Bacon's natural ontology, one would not expect his 
later theory of Forms to be concerned with the essence of anything that is (i.e., matter), 
but rather with the essence of the properties of that which is (i.e., with the observable 
simple natures of bodies composed of matter). When the form of a property had been 
discovered, one would not expect Bacon to have claimed to have located a new 
ontological entity of any kind (for the only ontological entities are particles of matter), 
but rather a rule of some sort leading to certain actions performable upon bodies that 
already existed. Let me now turn to Bacon's formulation of the theory itself to 
substantiate these expectations. 
 
On a given body, to generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures is 
the work and aim of human power. Of a given nature to discover the form, or 
true speciﬁc difference, or nature engendering nature, or source of emanation 
(for these are terms which come nearest to a description of the thing) is the 
work and aim of human knowledge.24 (italics mine) 
 
The work and aim of human knowledge is to discover the form of a given "nature" so 
that one may superinduce that nature upon a given body. What is the status of such a 
form in Bacon's philosophy? A form is not an entity that exists, for even though 
Anderson can say at one point "(Bacon) ﬁnally comes to regard forms both as the 
 
22 F. H. Anderson [1], page 302. 
23 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book I, Aphorism 75), page 73.  
24 Francis Bacon [5], remarks on the fable of Proteus, pages 49 and 50. 
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constituents of things and as the laws of their activity",25 he later admits that Bacon 
must have meant something other than material "things", for 
 
. . . granted nothing really exists as the object of natural science except 
individual bodies, performing individual acts according to law, yet this law, its 
investigation, discovery, and explication, is the basis of speculation and of 
works.26 
 
We are not to seek, therefore, for the forms of substances, for such forms 
 
. . . are so perplexed as they are not to be inquired . .. to enquire the Form of a 
lion, of an oak, of gold, nay of water, of air, is a vain pursuit.27 
 
We are rather to seek to embrace "the unity of nature in substances the most unlike",  
even though this unity is not a material entity (and hence does not exist).28 (italics mine) 
Nor are we to seek for the forms of compound bodies, for if one seeks to transform such 
bodies through the knowledge of latent process and conﬁguration, one "proceeds not 
by simple natures" but by inquiries relating 
 
. . .to natures concrete or combined into one structure, and have regard to what 
may be called particular and special habits of nature, not to her fundamental 
and universal laws which constitute forms.29 (italics mine) 
 
If, on the other hand, knowledge of forms is to permit us to transform such bodies, we 
must ﬁrst 
 
. . . .regard(s) a body as a troop or collection of simple natures . . . this kind of 
axiom, therefore, deduces the thing from the forms of simple natures . . .the 
principle of generating some one simple nature is the same as generating many 
. . . It must be said, however, that this mode of operation (which looks to simple 
natures though in a compound body) proceeds from what in nature is constant 
and eternal and universal.30 (italics mine) 
 
 
25 F. H. Anderson [2], page 79. 
26 Ibid., pages 159 and 160. 
27 Francis Bacon [1], AOL, page 257. 
28 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 3), page 122. 
29 Ibid., NO (Book II, Aphorism 5), page 125. 
30 Ibid., NO (Book II, Aphorism 5), page 124. 
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In neither case does Bacon permit us to speak of the forms of bodies themselves. 
(Though he directs us explicitly to "regard" bodies as a "collection of simple natures", he 
never suggests that bodies ontologically are such.) 
 
Forms, therefore, as eternal and universal laws, refer to the activity of matter but 
express only the essences of the properties of matter (i.e., the simple natures "upheld by 
matter") that constitute for all practical purposes the bodies themselves.  
 
. . . the essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures do consist (in simple 
natures); to enquire I say the true form of these is that part of Metaphysic which 
we now deﬁne of.31 
 
By investigating the forms of simple natures, that are "few in number", we should be 
able to control for practical purposes "all this variety" of nature. But this Metaphysical 
investigation of forms should not be confused with the Physical investigation of matter 
itself.32 
 
Thus, let the investigation of forms, which are (in the eye of reason at least, and 
in their essential law) eternal and immutable, constitute Metaphysics; and let 
the investigation of the efficient cause, and of matter, and of the latent process, 
and the latent conﬁguration (all of which have reference to the common and 
ordinary course of nature, not to her eternal and fundamental laws) constitute 
Physics.33 
 
For the aim of Metaphysics is "to discover the virtues and actions of bodies, with their 
laws as determined in matter."34 (italics mine) It is thus an error to hold that Bacon's 
theory of Forms effects a non-naturalistic modiﬁcation of his earlier ontological position, 
for Bacon is quite explicit to the contrary: Forms do not "give existence" at all! 
 
I noted and corrected as an error of the human mind the opinion that forms give 
existence. For though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, 
performing pure individual acts according to a ﬁxed law, yet in philosophy this 
very law, and the investigation, discovery, and explanation of it, is the 
foundation as well of knowledge as of operation. And it is this law with its 
clauses that I mean when I speak of forms, a name which I rather adopt because 
it has grown into use and become familiar.35 
 
31 Francis Bacon [2], AOL, page 257. 
32 Ibid., page 258. 
33 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 9), page 129. 
34 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 51), page 266.  
35 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 2), page 122.  
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In a word, Bacon's forms are abstract, and one must recognize "the essential character 
of Bacon's philosophy, the analysis of the concrete into the abstract."36 Yet it is obvious 
that Bacon himself often used the word 'abstract' in a polemical and derogatory 
manner. Can these two factors be reconciled? Only if Bacon was often inclined to use 
the word 'abstract' to mean something different from what we mean normally when we 
use the word (i.e., the opposite of 'concrete'). But I think that this is clearly the case, and 
that Bacon may have his abstract cake and eat it, too. 
 
Bacon warned us to be careful 
 
. . . that we may not either stick fast in things already known, or loosely grasp at 
shadows and abstract forms, not at things solid and realized in matter . . . 37,   
 
for we must avoid "ﬁgments of the human mind". 
 
But to resolve nature into abstractions is less to our purpose than to dissect her 
into parts . . . Matter rather than forms should be the object of our attention, its 
conﬁgurations and changes of conﬁguration, and simple action, and law of 
action or motion; for forms are ﬁgments of the human mind, unless you call 
those laws of action forms.38 
 
But why must we avoid such "ﬁgments"? When discussing axioms, Bacon almost let the 
cat from the bag: he was searching for those axioms "on which depend the affairs and 
fortunes of men". 
 
The highest and most general (which we now have) are notional and abstract 
and without solidity. But the middle are the true and the solid and living axioms, 
on which depend the affairs and fortunes of men; and above them again, last of 
all, those which are indeed the most general; such, I mean, as are not abstract, 
but of which those intermediate axioms are really limitations.39 
 
The meaning of 'abstract' in Bacon's normal usage should now be clear. An axiom is not 
to be considered abstract in virtue of its indirect derivation from (and hence indirect 
relationship to) the concrete world, but rather in virtue of its inability to lead men to a 
modiﬁcation of that world (i.e., its inability to affect the "fortunes of men"). 
 
 
36 Robert Leslie Ellis, page 24. 
37 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book I, Aphorism 106), page 99. 
38 Ibid., (Book I, Aphorism 51), page 53. 
39 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 104), page 98. 
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. . . nor do I think it matters much to the fortunes of men what abstract notions 
one may entertain concerning nature and the principles of things . . . for my part 
I do not trouble myself with any such speculative and withal unproﬁtable 
matters. My purpose . . . is to try whether I cannot in fact lay more ﬁrmly the 
foundations and extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of 
man.40 
 
The methods of the ancients were "evil" in that 
 
. . . they make the quiescent principles, wherefrom, and not the moving 
principles, whereby, things are produced, the object of their contemplation and 
inquiry. For the former tend to discourse, the latter to works.41 
 
The aim of Bacon's method of induction, therefore (that "must be used not only to 
discover axioms, but also in the formation of notions"42), was not to avoid abstraction, 
as one might have been led to think, but rather to avoid "overhasty" abstraction. 
 
Therefore, if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are 
confused and overhastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no ﬁrmness in 
the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.43 
 
Forms can be spoken of correctly as "inventions" of man, if they are not (as with Plato) 
"absolutely abstracted from matter" and are thus "fruitful and important to the state of 
man".44 And in the same paragraph in which he says blankly "I would not be understood 
to speak of abstract forms", Bacon implies most clearly the abstract nature of his forms. 
 
For when I speak of forms, I mean nothing more than those laws and 
determinations of absolute actuality which govern and constitute any simple 
nature, as heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is 
susceptible of them. Thus the form of heat or the form of light is the same thing 
as the law of heat or the law of light. . . And therefore when I say (for instance) 
in the investigation of the form of heat, "reject rarity", or "rarity does not 
belong to the form of heat", it is the same as if I said, "It is possible to 
superinduce heat on a dense body"; or, "It is possible to take away or keep out 
heat from a rare body.45 
 
 
40 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 114), page 106. 
41 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 66), page 64. 
42 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 105), page 99. 
43 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 14), page 41. 
44 Francis Bacon [2], AOL, page 256. 
45 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 17), page 152. 
Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms Page 11 of 19  
The forms of simple natures are elsewhere compared with "the letters of the alphabet 
(which) in themselves and apart have no use or meaning, yet they are the subject 
matter for the composition and apparatus of all discourse."46 A form that is useless is 
meaningless – and hence abstract. That this was, indeed, the essential polemical 
meaning of 'abstract' for Bacon received ﬁnal conﬁrmation in Aphorism 17 of Book II of 
the Novum Organum, for here Bacon, sensing the "somewhat abstract nature" of his 
forms, reacted by saying that his forms cannot be considered abstract, not because they 
do not resemble as propositions other abstract assertions, but rather because they have 
proven to be useful. 
 
But if anyone conceive that my forms too are of a somewhat abstract nature, 
because they mix and combine things heterogeneous (red objects, hot objects, 
dead objects). . .  he may be assured that his mind is held in captivity by custom, 
by the gross appearance of things, and by men's opinions. For it is most certain 
that these things, however heterogeneous and alien from each other, agree in 
the form or law which governs heat, redness and death; and that the power of 
man cannot possibly be emancipated and exalted to new efﬁcients and new 
modes of operation, except by the revelation and discovery of forms of this 
kind.47 
 
It is thus apparent that Bacon was polemically prone to use 'abstract' as synonymous 
with 'useless', though in more sober moments he could indeed unpolemically 
characterize the goal of Metaphysics as "abstract" in the conventional sense. 
 
I may preserve this much of the conceit of antiquity, that Physic should 
contemplate that which is inherent in matter and therefore transitory, and 
Metaphysic that which is abstracted and ﬁxed. And again that Physic should 
handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving, and 
Metaphysic should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason, 
understanding, and platform.48 
 
Forms, therefore, are not material but "materiate" (i.e., useless if separated from 
matter). 
 
 
46 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 121), page 110. 
47 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 17), page 153. 
48 Francis Bacon [2], AOL, page 255. 
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Forms are materiate, and not. . .  separate, or separable from matter. Matter is 
subject to inherent causation, but the cause itself is not caused. The only 
authority beyond any sense is a more general cause: to this it stands not in the 
relation of effect but as species to genus.49 
 
The form of a simple nature does not purport to indicate the material cause of the 
simple nature, but only its abstract essence (i.e., its genus, asserted in terms of another 
general simple nature). 
 
When I say of motion that it is the genus of which heat is the species, I would be 
understood to mean not that heat generates motion or that motion generates 
heat (though both are true in certain cases), but that heat itself, its essence and 
quiddity, is motion and nothing else . . .  50 
 
And it should be noted that Bacon did not believe (as some critics have claimed) "that, if 
the form of any quality were known, we should be able, by inducing that form on any 
body, to communicate to it the said quality",51 for Bacon clearly conceded that 
knowledge of its abstract form in no sense assured the universal inductibility of a simple 
nature. 
 
So that it is probable that there may exist materials in the bowels of the earth 
which altogether refuse to be heated, because through their greater 
condensation they are destitute of that spirit with which this motion of 
excitation generally begins.52 
 
Bacon's forms are the "true differences of things"53 (that are in fact laws of pure act). 
The direction of a perfect rule of operation must be "that it be certain, free, and 
disposing or leading to action"; the direction of a true and perfect axiom of knowledge 
"that another nature be discovered which is convertible with the given nature and yet is 
a limitation of a more general nature, as of a true and real genus"; and 
 
These two directions, the one active and the other contemplative, are one and 
the same thing; and what in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most 
true.54 (italics mine) 
 
49 F. H. Anderson [1], page 304. 
50 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 20), page 157. 
51 George L. Craik, page 418. Craik is here speaking in agreement with a 'Professor 
Playfair'. See also Benjamin Farrington [1], page 121.  
52 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 48), page 242. 
53 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 75), page 73. 
54 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 4), page 123. 
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It is in this sense that the "form of a thing is the very thing itself",55 for that which is 
most useful in operation is that form which describes most clearly the essence of a 
simple nature (i.e., the simple nature "in relation to the universe, not simply in relation 
to man")56. The mark of a true form was to be its usefulness, for a form was to be 
considered as relating "to the universe" to the extent that it was useful. Aside from 
divine revelation, no other criterion was possible, for Bacon wished to build "in the 
human understanding a true model of the world, such as it is in fact, not such as man's 
own reason would have it to be".57 
 
(idols of the human mind) are nothing more than arbitrary abstractions .. . 
(ideas of the divine) are the Creator's own stamp upon creation, impressed and 
deﬁned in matter by true and exquisite lines. Truth and utility are in this kind 
the very things we seek for; and works themselves are of greater value as 
pledges of truth than as contributing to the comforts of life.58 
 
 
55 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 13), page 142. Note that the word 'thing' in the quotation 
does not refer to body. As Spedding puts it, in a note to the passage in its original Latin on page 
148 of Francis Bacon [4], "'res' is to be taken in a general sense, so as to include not only 
substances, but also what Bacon calls naturae. It is therefore not to be translated as if it were 
synonymous with 'corpus'. I should like to emphasize that, in this particular instance, it refers 
solely to the class of simple natures and does not include substances at all." 
56 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 20), page 161. 
57 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 124), page 113. 
58 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 124), pages 113 and 114. The sentence "Truth and utility are in 
this kind the very things we seek for" has been substituted for the original translation of 
Spedding that read 'Truth and utility are here the very same things'. The Latin (see Francis Bacon 
[4], page 218) reads "Itaque ipsissimae es sunt (in hoc genere) veritas et utilitas". In a note on 
the same page, Spedding comments: 
 
I do not think the use of ipsissimae here can be justified; if the meaning be (as far as I 
think it must) that truth and utility are (in this kind) 'the very same things'. If ipsissimae 
be used correctly, the meaning must be that things themselves, the very facts of nature, 
are truth and utility both. But in that case we should expect 'et veritas et utilitas'. Mr. 
Ellis proposes to render the phrase thus: Truth and utility are in this kind the very things 
we seek for'. But to me it seems less probable that Bacon would have expressed such a 
meaning by such a phrase than that he used the word ipsissimae incorrectly in the sense 
I have attributed to it. 
 
I cannot agree with Mr. Spedding's conclusion, for if Bacon had indeed meant to say 'the very 
same things', he would have used the construction that he usually employs to say it – i.e., 'res 
eadem sunt' (e.g., Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 4), page 230): "Now these two 
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A useful work indeed was to be valued as a pledge of truth, but this should not be 
confused with the false assertion that a work could be known to be true apart from 
being shown to be useful. 
 
Science also must be known by works. It is by witness of works, rather than by 
logic or even observation, that truth is revealed and established. Whence it 
follows that the improvement of man's mind and the improvement of his lot are 
one and the same thing.59 (italics mine) 
 
In Valerius Terminus (1603) "no mention is made of the necessity of correcting 
commonly received notions of simple natures".60 Yet some critics, familiar only with the 
Novum Organum and the method therein stated solely in terms of the theory of Forms, 
have misunderstood Bacon's conception of form and wondered how he could assume 
either that every simple nature had a form or that all forms would be useful. The 
answers should now be apparent. 
 
(1) Every simple nature had a form, for the form was a rule or direction 
showing how this nature could be superinduced upon a body. It did not purport 
to say anything at all about the essence of what is (i.e., matter), only about what 
could be done with the properties of what is (i.e., the simple natures); the 
essence of a simple nature was identical with the rule of its inducibility. 
 
(2) Every form was useful, for to Bacon nothing that was not useful could 
count as a form. By deﬁnition only a useful rule or direction could qualify as a 
form. 
 
In the words of Ellis: 
 
Bacon always assumes that the knowledge of Forms would greatly increase our 
command over nature . . . (because) Bacon connected the doctrine of Forms 
with practical operations, because this doctrine, so to speak, represented to him 
his original notion of the freeing of a direction, which, as the phrase itself 
implies, had altogether a practical signiﬁcance.61 
 
 
directions, the one active and the other contemplative, are one and the same thing" (see page 
12 above for citation to different anthology.] Thus, I have followed the suggestion of Mr. Ellis 
that I believe to be the more correct.  
59 From Francis Bacon's "Thoughts and Conclusion" as translated by Benjamin Farrington 
[2], page 93. 
60 Robert Leslie Ellis, from Francis Bacon [3], page 23. 
61 Ibid., page 25. 
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Or again, in Bacon's own words: 
 
For ﬁrst of all we must prepare a natural and experimental history, sufﬁcient 
and good; and this is the foundation of all, for we are not to imagine or suppose, 
but to discover, what nature does or may be made to do.62 
 
 
IV 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to clarify and defend the pragmatic (i.e., non-
ontological) function of Bacon's theory of Forms. Such a defense would hardly have 
been necessary, I think, if sufficient notice had been taken in Baconian criticism of the 
limitations that Bacon himself came to impose upon his method (the disregard of which 
can serve only to foster a mistaken notion of the aim and content of the method itself). 
 
In concluding Section III above, I quoted from Aphorism 10 of Book II of the Novum 
Organum in which Bacon referred to the compilation of a "sufﬁcient and good" natural 
history as "the foundation of all." As his work progressed, Bacon was to become even 
more insistent, for in the last aphorism of Book I, written at a later date than the 
contents of Book II,63 Bacon "announces the decision to abandon the Logic for the 
Encyclopedia"64 in terms that hardly permit one to interpret the Forms with which his 
method had been concerned as possessing a deﬁnitive ontological status. 
 
And now it is time for me to propound the art itself of interpreting nature, in 
which, although I conceive that I have given true and most useful precepts, yet I 
do not say either that it is absolutely necessary (as if nothing could be done 
without it) or that it is perfect. For I am of the opinion that if men had ready at 
hand a just history of nature and experience, and labored diligently thereon, 
and if they could bind themselves to two rules—the ﬁrst, to lay aside received 
opinions and notions; and the second, to refrain the mind for a time from the 
highest generalizations, and those next to them – they would be able by the 
native and genuine force of the mind, without any other art, to fall into my form 
of interpretation. For interpretation is the true and natural work of the mind 
when freed from impediments. It is true, however, that by my precepts 
everything will be in more readiness, and much more sure. 
 
 
62 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 10), page 130. 
63 Benjamin Farrington [1], page 133. 
64 Ibid., page 133. 
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Nor again do I mean to say that no improvement can be made upon these. On 
the contrary, I regard that the mind, not only in its own faculties, but in its 
connection with things, must needs hold that the art of discovery may advance 
as discoveries advance.65 
 
The precepts of Bacon's method were seen by Bacon as "true and most useful" but 
hardly perfect. In other words, they did not purport to bring certainty, but only to make 
things "much more sure." 
 
In the preface to The Great Instauration, Bacon had brazenly suggested that "I suppose 
that I have established forever a true and lawful marriage between the empirical and 
the rational faculty," whose "divorce and separation. . . has thrown into confusion all 
the affairs of the human family".66 But as Book I of the Novum Organum is nearing its 
conclusion, we can hear the proper and less pretentious echo of Bacon's aim: to effect" 
a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the 
rational."67 Bacon had hoped to "supply the mind such rules and guidance that it may in 
every case apply itself to the nature of things",68 but knowledge could only expect "to 
abridge the inﬁnity of individual experience as much as the conception of truth will 
permit".69 Man should strive to have knowledge of the Forms, so that he might then 
effect the "transformation of concrete bodies, so far as this is possible".70 
 
Bacon did not construe his method of Forms, therefore, as leading to certainty, but 
rather to sufficiency; indeed, his theory purported to bear as close a family resemblance 
to the theories of the sceptics as to the theories of any other philosophical house. 
 
 
65 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book I, Aphorism 130), pages 119 and 120. 
66 Ibid., Preface to The Great Instauration, page 14.  
67 Ibid., NO (Book I, Aphorism 95), page 93.  
68 Ibid., (Book I, Aphorism 127), page 116.  
69 Francis Bacon [2], AOL, op. cit. (footnote 4), page 258. See also Francis Bacon [1], NO 
(Aphorism 1, Book II), page 121. 
70 Francis Bacon [1], NO (Book II, Aphorism 1), page 121.  
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(I am) one who maintains not simply that nothing can be known, but only that 
nothing can be known except in a certain course and way; and yet establishes 
provisionally certain degrees of assurance for use and relief until the mind shall 
arrive at a knowledge of causes in which it can rest. For even those schools of 
philosophy which held the absolute impossibility of knowing any- thing were not 
inferior to those which took upon them to pronounce. But then they did not 
provide helps for the sense and understanding, as I have done, but simply took 
away all their authority; which is quite a different thing – almost the reverse.71 
  
As early as 1607 Bacon had remarked that 
 
. . . a valid axiom . . . should not be narrowly cut to the measure of the facts 
from which it is drawn. It should have a more ample scope, permitting the 
inclusion of new facts under it by which its ﬁnal limits would be ﬁxed.72 
 
And in the Preface to the Novum Organum, Bacon could hardly have been more explicit. 
 
Now my method, though hard to practice, is easy to explain; and it is this. I 
propose to establish progressive stages of certainty.73 
 
"Progressive stages of certainty" are all ﬁnite man can expect to ﬁnd. 
 
To God, truly, the Giver and Architect of Forms . . . it belongs to have an 
affirmative knowledge of forms immediately, and from the ﬁrst contemplation. 
But this assuredly is more than man can do . . . 74 
 
For since every body contains in itself many forms of natures united together in 
a concrete state. . .they severally crush, depress, break, and enthrall one 
another, and thus the individual forms are obscured.75 
 
 
71 Francis Bacon [1], Plan of The Great Instauration, page 28. 
72 From Francis Bacon, "Thoughts and Conclusions", as translated by Benjamin 
Farrington in Farrington [2], page 99.  
73 Francis Bacon [1], NO ("Preface"), page 33. 
74 Ibid., (Book II, Aphorism 15), page 151. 
75 Ibid., (Book II, Aphorism 24), page 166. 
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Bacon's method therefore recognizes a resting at stages upon "a sort of Lesser Form". 
 
For since the genuine forms (which are always convertible with the proposed 
nature) lie deep and are hard to ﬁnd, it is required by the circumstances of the 
case and the inﬁrmity of human understanding that particular forms, which 
collect together certain groups of instances (though not all) into some common 
notion, be not neglected, but rather be diligently observed. For whatever unites 
nature, though imperfectly, paves the way to the discovery of forms.76 
 
The important thing is not to have arrived, but to be sufficiently on the way. For "the 
true and lawful goal of the sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed 
with new discoveries and powers"; and it is little wonder that science had not advanced 
in the past. 
 
And if by chance there be one who seeks after truth in earnest, yet even he will 
propose to himself such a kind of truth as shall yield satisfaction to the mind and 
understanding in rendering causes for things long since discovered, and not the 
truth which shall lead to new assurance of works and new light of axioms. If 
then the end of the sciences has not as yet been well placed, it is not strange 
that men have erred as to the means.77 
 
The "means" of science (i.e., the method of induction employed upon the history and 
tables of discovery) are to be justiﬁed because they are useful, not because they have 
been shown to be ontologically grounded. For no "felicity of art or wit" could provide a 
non-experimental conﬁrmation or correction of such a natural history. 
 
It is nevertheless true that if the mistakes in natural history and experiments are 
important, frequent, and continual, they cannot possibly be corrected or 
amended by any felicity of wit or art. And therefore, if in my natural history, 
which has been collected and tested with so much diligence, severity, and I may 
say religious care, there still lurk at intervals certain falsities or errors in the 
particulars, what is to be said of common natural history, which in comparison 
with mine is so negligent and inexact? And what of the philosophy and sciences 
built on such a sand (or rather quicksand)? Let no man therefore trouble him- 
self for this.78 
 
Bacon did not equate all knowledge relevant to the natural world with power, "for to 
form judicious wishes is as much a part of knowledge as to ask judicious questions".79 
 
76 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 26), page 170. 
77 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 81), page 78. 
78 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 118), page 108. 
79 Ibid. (Book II, Aphorism 49), page 251. 
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Yet it must be insisted again that Bacon wished mankind to know all that "we need to 
know" to increase our power and empire. Perfect knowledge was not the goal, though 
sufficient knowledge was; for only that which was most useful was most perfect. 
 
It will also be thought that by forbidding men to pronounce and to set down 
principles as established until they have duly arrived through the intermediate 
steps at the highest generalities, I maintain a sort of suspension of the judgment 
. . . But in reality that which I mediate and propound is . . . not denial of the 
capacity to understand, but provision for understanding truly. . . better surely it 
is that we should know all we need to know, and yet think our knowledge 
imperfect, than that we should think our knowledge perfect, and yet not know 
anything we need to know.80  
 
I have argued that it is a distortion to consider Bacon's theory of Forms as having an 
ontological rather than a pragmatic interpretation, for neither his ontological nor his 
methodological formulations support such an interpretation, while the expressed raison 
d'être of the latter is utilitarian in the extreme. To Bacon, that which was true of the 
natural world could not be distinguished from that which was useful in transforming it 
to the beneﬁt of mankind. Or as the empathetic Ellis was to put it,  
 
. . . (Bacon) has often been called an utilitarian; not because he loved truth less 
than others, but because he loved men more.81  
 
 
 
80 Ibid. (Book I, Aphorism 126), page 115. 
81 Robert Leslie Ellis, from Bacon [3], page 34. 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
F. H. Anderson [1].  Francis Bacon: his Career and his Thought (The Arensberg Lectures, 
Second Series) (Los Angeles, California: University of Southern California Press, 
1962). 
 
F. H. Anderson [2].  The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Chicago, Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948). 
 
Francis Bacon [1].  Francis Bacon: The New Organon and Related Writings, edited by 
Fulton Anderson (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. (The Library 
of the Liberal Arts, general editor, Oscar Piest), 1960).  
 
Francis Bacon [2].  Francis Bacon: Selected Writings, edited by Hugh G. Dick (New York, 
New York: Modern Library, 1955). 
 
Francis Bacon [3].  The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon (reprinted from the texts 
and translations, with the notes and prefaces of Ellis and Spedding), edited by 
John M. Robertson (London, England: George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1905). 
 
Francis Bacon [4].  The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. I (prefaces and notes 
by Robert Leslie Ellis), edited by James Spedding (London, England, 1861).  
 
Francis Bacon [5].  The Works of Francis Bacon, Miscellaneous Writings in Philosophy, 
Vol. III, printed by James Cundee, Ivy-Lane, for M. Jones (London, England: 
Paternoster Row, London, 1807). [The anthology Includes a translation of 
Bacon's De Sapientia Veterum.] 
 
George L. Craik.  Bacon: His Writings and Philosophy (London, England: Griﬂin, Bohn and 
Company, 1862). 
 
Robert Leslie Ellis.  "General Preface to Bacon’s Philosophical Works", reprinted in 
Francis Bacon [3]. 
 
Benjamin Farrington [1].  Francis Bacon, Philosopher of Industrial Science (London, 
England: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1951). 
 
Benjamin Farrington [2].  The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool, England: Liverpool 
University Press, 1964). [Farrington's book includes his original translations of 
Bacon’s The Masculine Birth of Time (1603), Thoughts and Conclusions (1607) 
and The Refutation of Philosophies (1608)]. 
 
